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TITLE VII: DISCRIMINATORY RESULTS AND THE SCOPE OF
BUSINESS NECESSITY
Title VII' of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 sought to end racially
discriminatory employment practices. The statute forbids discrimi-
natory application of employment standards as well as standards
racially discriminatory on their face.' An employer may argue that
Title VII requires only that an employment standard be nondiscrimi-
natory in its terms, purpose and application and that the results
under such a standard are irrelevant to an inquiry into alleged unlaw-
ful discrimination. The justification for this view is that requiring
results to be nondiscriminatory might create situations in which un-
qualified blacks are given preferential treatment over more qualified
whites.' However, failure to consider the results of a practice in deter-
mining whether it is discriminatory would disregard the subtle nu-
ances of employment discrimination, and ignore a major social goal
of Title VII, which has been described as "a desire to enhance the
relative social and economic position of the American black com-
munity."6 In determining whether that goal has been achieved, re-
sults are highly relevant. Accordingly, the courts view the results
under an employment standard as a critical factor in their determina-
tions of Title VII cases.
The Origins of Business Necessity
The first United States Supreme Court decision to confront the
issue of treatment and results under Title VII was Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.' At one of defendant's power plants, the requirements for
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1970).
2. Id. at §§ 2000a-2000h.
3. Id. § 2000e-2a: (a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other-
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
4. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 236 (1971).
5. Id. 236.
6. Developments in the Law, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HAR. L. REV. 1109, 1113 (1971).
7. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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placement in the higher paying non-labor department jobs8 were a
high school diploma and satisfactory scores on an achievement test.'
These standards resulted in no blacks being assigned to non-labor
jobs until August, 1966, five months after charges were filed with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.1°
The standards were not discriminatory on their face, and both
the federal district court" and the court of appeals 2 found no showing
of a racial or an invidious intent in their adoption or application.
Though accepting these findings, a unanimous Supreme Court re-
jected the conclusion of both lower courts that there had been no
violation of the Act, and held that even in the absence of discrimina-
tory intent the testing mechanisms operated as " 'built-in headwinds'
. . . unrelated to measuring job capability."' 3 Fair application of
racially neutral standards was not deemed sufficient to satisfy Title
VII.
What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbi-
trary and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers
operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other
impermissible classification. . . . The Act proscribes not only
overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necess-
ity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes
cannot be shown to be related to job performance the practice is
prohibited."
Thus, if the results of a practice reveal an exclusion of applicants on
the basis of race, justification for such a practice can be maintained
only if the employer can show business necessity.
Since the Griggs decision, interpretations of the business necess-
ity test have arisen in two discernible contexts. In the first context,
the discriminatory results of a particular employment standard are
8. Id. at 427. The five departments were Labor, Coal Handling, Operations, Main-
tenance, and Laboratory and Testing. The lowest of these in terms of pay and advance-
ment opportunity was the labor department. Prior to the effective date of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the Company had openly discriminated on the basis of race, and
blacks were assigned only to the labor department.
9. For an in depth discussion of validation of ability tests with respect to Title
VII see Employment Discrimination: A Title VII Symposium, 34 LA. L. REV. 540, 572-
89 (1974).
10. 401 U.S. 424, 427 n.2 (1971).
11. 292 F. Supp. 243 (M.D. N.C. 1969).
12. 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970).
13. 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
14. Id. at 431.
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reflected in the business itself by the employment of minority group
members in numbers adversely disproportionate to their presence in
the immediately available work force. In the second context, applica-
tion of employment standards involving arrests, convictions and gar-
nishments result in the elimination of a disproportionate number of
minority group members at the job selection level. In this case, the
presence and status of minority members in the particular work unit
involved is of peripheral concern at best and is generally disregarded.
These two areas of discrimination call for different tests of business
necessity.
Discriminatory Results in the Work Unit
The courts have considered several cases similar to Griggs in-
volving work units containing a disproportionate number of blacks
when compared with the available work force. In Rowe v. General
Motors Corp., ,5 percentages of blacks transferred to available salaried
jobs from hourly jobs 6 were correlated with procedures by which
transfers were made'7 to produce a finding of racial discrimination in
violation of Title VII. The promotion procedures were heavily laden
with subjective evaluation by the employee's immediate foreman and
bore no relation to job performance." To the Fifth Circuit, the ad-
versely disproportionate figures were critical"9 and placed upon the
employer the "burden of demonstrating why . . . the apparent dis-
parity [was] not the real one."20 The only reasons deemed acceptable
by the court were those arising from a non-discriminatory legitimate
15. 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972).
16. Of 169 salaried clerks at General Motors' Atlanta plant, 157 were white and
12 were black. Of the 224 salaried foremen, 214 were white and 10 were black. Id. at
352 n.6.
17. An hourly employee could secure transfer from hourly to salaried jobs either
by employer-initiated action or employee-initiated action. The employer-initiated ac-
tion involved the recommendation of the hourly employee for the salaried job by his
immediate foreman to the general foreman or salaried personnel administrator. This
chain then led to the management development committee which was made up often
persons, and a majority vote of the committee was required for promotion. In the
employee-initiated method, the employee seeking transfer was to make direct applica-
tion to the salaried personnel administrator. The administrator then directed the
employee to obtain the recommendation of his immediate foreman. Only then was the
employee's name submitted to the Management Development Committee, where a
majority vote was again required for promotion. In this case, plaintiffs sought salaried
jobs through the employee-initiated method and were unsuccessful. Id. at 353.
18. "In one [instance] the process never gets started, in the other it stops in its
tracks unless the foreman puts his blessings on the prospect." Id.
19. Id. at 358.
20. Id.
[Vol. 35
1974] COMMENTS
business necessity.2 Since the subjective evaluations of immediate
foremen were not grounded in any such necessity, they provided "a
ready mechanism for discrimination against Blacks much of which
can be covertly concealed."22 That the employer "willingly" or "en-
thusiastically" attempted to eliminate segregation on the job site was
not considered relevant to the inquiry. 2
In another recent case, Bing v. Roadway Express,24 a lower fed-
eral court strictly applied Griggs in a situation involving dispropor-
tionate racial composition in a work unit, despite the non-job related
justifications proffered by the employer. The employment practice
under attack was a no-transfer rule which restricted and penalized
transfers from the job of "city driver" to the more lucrative and
desirable job of "road driver." 5 Whites were employed both as city
drivers and road drivers but all blacks were city drivers." Such figures
established a prima facie case that race was a factor in staffing the
two driver categories. 7
In an attempt to rebut this prima facie case, defendant-employer
cited training costs, safety, and labor problems to justify the no-
transfer rule on grounds of business necessity. First, defendant
claimed that transfers caused additional training costs. Next, the rule
21. Id. at 354.
22. Id. at 359.
23. Id. at 355. A situation similar to Rowe was involved in Hester v. Southern
Railway Co., 349 F. Supp. 812 (N.D. Ga. 1972). A district court finding of fact deter-
mined that although whites were applying in only slightly larger numbers than blacks
for the Data Typist position, defendant hired three times as many whites as blacks.
In addition to the use of an unvalidated employment test, which plaintiff had passed,
the employer defendant had used a single screening interview. This interview was
conducted by defendant's only personnel officer who had been given no guidelines,
standards or instructions for making his unreviewable decision and who could not
remember his reason for rejecting plaintiffs employment application. Quoting the
"ready mechanism" language of Rowe, the court found a violation of Title VII. How-
ever, the Fifth Circuit reversed, 497 F.2d 1374 (1974), saying that the district court
findings of fact were unreliable. Therefore, no competent evidence was adduced estab-
lishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination as to the screening interview. Thus,
the lower court determination as to the facts was "clearly erroneous." Had there been
a prima facie case of discrimination supported by competent evidence, the court found
the interview process "uncomfortably close" to the promotion procedure proscribed by
Rowe. The case was remanded to the district court to determine if available statistical
information, possibly making a prima facie case of discrimination, could be
ascertained.
24. 444 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1971).
25. An employee had to resign the city driver position and forfeit accrued employ-
ment rights under it without any assurances prior to resigning his city driver job that
he would be hired for the new position of road driver. Id. at 688.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 689.
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was justified from a safety standpoint: road driving skills are different
from those necessary to adequate city driving performance. Finally,
defendant claimed that the transfers would cause labor problems
because the two job categories were covered by different collective
bargaining agreements. 8 The court found each of these allegations
insufficient. While training costs would certainly result from trans-
fers, it was just as certain that such costs would be incurred in filling
the positions with new employees. Secondly, safety considerations
could be satisfied by screening transferees in the same way new appli-
cants are screened. Finally, the court concluded that every change in
employee status is likely to lead to some personnel problems., Be-
cause clear evidence of discriminatory results within the employer's
own work force were shown, the court felt no inclination to give the
employer the benefit of the doubt as to any of its alleged grounds for
business necessity, and thus found racial discrimination in violation
of Title VII. It thus seems likely that little consideration will be given
to the factors of cost, efficiency, and safety, when disproportionate
representation of minority group members in the work unit makes out
a prima facie case of discrimination.
Arrests, Convictions and Garnishments
Quite often job criteria reflect social practices which have an
adverse effect on minority group members. For example, blacks and
other minorities are subject to arrest, conviction and multiple gar-
nishment in greater percentages than whites. 0 In these instances,
when the claim is that an employment standard constitutes illegal
discrimination because it includes these factors, the courts have en-
countered difficulty in applying the Griggs test of business necessity
based upon job performance.
28. Id. at 690.
29. Id. at 691.
30. See Merriweather v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 362 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Ala.
1973); Johnson v. Pike Corp., 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971); Richardson v. Hotel
Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. La. 1971), aff'd without opinion 468 F.2d
951 (5th Cir. 1972); Gregory v. Litton Indus., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd
472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972). See also text at nn. 33, 49, 50 infra.
In Griggs the Court cited 1960 North Carolina census statistics which showed that
the defendant's high school diploma requirement could operate to exclude blacks from
the work force because the census revealed that while 34 percert of white males had
completed high school, only 12 percent of black males had done so. However, this figure
was utilized by the Court in considerations of the validity of the test given and the
diploma requirement was considered as linked to the test for the purpose of discerning
whether or not it was a "professionally developed ability test" within the meaning of
the statute. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
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Prior to the Supreme Court's formulation in Griggs of a business
necessity test arguably confined to considerations of job performance,
the Ninth Circuit applied a broader definition of business necessity
in Gregory v. Litton Industries," a case involving employee arrest
records. In Gregory a black applicant was offered employment as a
sheet metal mechanic, but before undertaking his duties he disclosed
on a preliminary security information form required of all Litton
employees that he had been arrested fourteen times on charges in-
volving non-traffic violations. In fact, plaintiff had never been con-
victed of any of the charges and it is unclear from the opinion whether
he had even been brought to trial on any of them. The district court
found that Litton's policy of disqualifying frequently arrested persons
from employment was objectively applied and enforced without refer-
ence to race.3" However, the court also found that such a policy of
perusing arrest records of an applicant could have discriminatory
results. Nationwide statistics cited by the court justified its finding
that "Negroes are arrested substantially more frequently than whites
in proportion to their numbers." Using a rationale similar to that
later employed in Griggs, the court held that "[a]n intent to dis-
criminate is not required to be shown so long as the discrimination
shown is not accidental or inadvertent." 4
This intentional use of such a discriminatory practice is forbid-
den by Title VII unless the employer can justify it on grounds of
business necessity which "in this context" the court defined as "es-
sential to the safe and efficient operation of the business."3 This
definition considers not merely the individual's capability to fill the
job, but also his suitability for the job from the viewpoint of the
employer's interest in safety and efficiency.
In applying its version of the business necessity test, the court
found no reason to believe that persons arrested on a number of
occasions, but not convicted, are any less honest or efficient than
other employees.36 Accordingly, such information was irrelevant to
suitability for employment.37 Litton's policy was therefore held to be
31. 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972).
32. Gregory v. Litton Indus., 316 F. Supp. 401, 402 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
33. Id. at 403. The court cited nationwide statistics showing that while blacks
make up 11 percent of the U.S. population, they account for 27 percent of reported
arrests and 45 percent of "suspicion" arrests.
34. Id. at 403.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 402-03. In fact, according to the court, the evidence was "overwhelm-
ingly" contrary to any conclusion that persons arrested but not convicted are any less
honest or efficient than other employees.
37. Id. at 403.
1974]
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unlawful under Title VII "because it [had] the foreseeable effect of
denying black applicants an equal opportunity for employment."38
In shaping its enforcement decree, the court again took cogniz-
ance of the safety and efficiency aspects of business necessity. 9 Litton
was restrained from using arrest records gathered from any source,
public or private.4' However, the company was not restrained from
getting the public record of any prosecution and trial of a prospective
employee, 4' matters that presumably may be relevant to considera-
tions of the safe and efficient operation of a business. The definition
of business necessity enunciated by the court is much broader than
that used in Griggs, which limited business necessity to the factor of
job performance.2
Whether the business necessity test advanced in Griggs is lim-
ited to the facts of that particular case or whether the court intended
job performance to be the exclusive criterion of business necessity in
all cases is not clear. In Johnson v. Pike Corp.," a federal district
court chose the latter interpretation. An employee was discharged
after his wages had been garnished several times." The discharge was
effected under a company rule providing for issuance of a warning to
an employee after the first garnishment, and termination of his em-
ployment after several garnishments.
According to the Johnson court, Griggs established a two step
approach for determining whether an employment practice is prohib-
ited under Title VII.45 The first step is to ascertain whether the prac-
38. Id.
39. The court of appeals reversed the injunctive relief on other grounds, namely
that in the action, which was not brought as a class action, Gregory was seeking
individual relief only and that the injunctive relief granted was "neither incidental nor
necessary to the resolution of the pending litigation." Gregory v. Litton Indus., 472
F.2d 631, 634 (9th Cir. 1972).
40. Gregory v. Litton Indus., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
41. Id.
42. See note 14 and accompanying test supra. The business necessity test in
Gregory is similar to that in another pre-Griggs case, Local 189, United Papermakers
& Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
919 (1970), which limited the carrying over of past discrimination into the present
through a seniority system to situations where "incidents are limited to those that
safety and efficiency require." 416 F.2d at 994.
43. 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
44. This case was not rendered moot by Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S.
337 (1969), which found pre-judgment garnishment unconstitutional as violative of the
due process clause, because all the garnishments rendered against plaintiff were post-
judgment garnishments. Nor was plaintiff aided by Title III of the Consumer Credit
Protection Act of 1968, which provides that no employer may discharge an employee
for a garnishment as to one indebtedness. 15 U.S.C. § 1674 (1968). In Johnson multiple
garnishments were involved.
45. 332 F. Supp. at 493.
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tice discriminates against any group or person on the basis of race. 41
Looking to a survey of the available information on wage garnish-
ment, the court found that minority group members suffer wage gar-
nishments in a substantially higher proportion than do others in the
general population. 7 The second step is to determine "whether the
practice bears a 'demonstrable relationship' to successful job per-
formance.""' Although stating that "the exact boundaries and con-
tours of the phrase 'business necessity' are still uncertain,"," the court
nevertheless indicated where it felt those particular boundaries lie:
The sole permissible reason for discriminating against actual or
prospective employees involves the individual's capability to per-
form the job effectively. This approach leaves no room for argu-
ments regarding inconvenience, annoyance or even expense to the
employer.5°
Therefore, the employee could not be removed as long as he success-
fully performed the day to day mechanics of his job, regardless of the
administrative costs to the employer because of repeated garnish-
ments of his employee's salary. This is an unreasonable and unrealis-
tic restriction of the scope of the business necessity test. An employer
seeks to make a profit from his business. An employee who consis-
tently burdens his employer with administrative costs and thereby
diminishes that profit, is an undesirable worker despite his job
skills.-' Moreover, the same result could have been reached without
adopting such a restrictive interpretation of the business necessity
test.
A business necessity test recognizing employer interests in safety
and efficiency would not necessarily allow the burden of business
necessity to be met by a mere showing of any conceivable safety or
efficiency in maintaining a practice that results in discrimination.
Rather, the hazards or inefficiencies involved should be shown to
46. Id.
47. Id. at 494.
48. Id. at 493.
49. Id. at 495.
50. Id. Because the Johnson court believed that Griggs intended the job capability
criterion of "business necessity" to be "exclusive," the only matters considered of
importance in determining "business necessity" were necessarily those connected with
job performance.
51. An employer's "interest is in making a profit from his business. The most
skilled employee who consistently costs the company more money, perhaps through
excessive garnishments, than his work contributes, is an undesirable worker." Note,
85 HARV. L. REv. 1482, 1486 (1972).
19741
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outweigh the discriminatory impact. Thus, a defendant could not
argue that relatively slight expenses outweigh the individual and
societal interests in the enforcement of Title VII. Only "substantial" 2
expense which would impair significantly the efficiency of the em-
ployer's operation would justify a discriminatory practice.53
Contrary to Johnson, a federal district court in Richardson v.
Hotel Corporation of America," appeared to reject the idea that the
Griggs definition of business necessity was an exclusive one. Plaintiff
filed an application for employment at a New Orleans hotel at the
time it began operation. He truthfully filled out his employment
application and responded affirmatively to the question of whether
he had ever been convicted of a crime other than a minor traffic
violation. Before police checks could be made, plaintiff was hired as
a bellman to work during the opening of the hotel. After his record
of convictions for theft and receiving stolen goods became known to
the management, they informed plaintiff that he no longer could be
employed as a bellman. Upon plaintiff's refusal of an offer of other
employment with the hotel, he was discharged.5
The plaintiff maintained that since more blacks than whites are
convicted of serious crimes, the discharge of persons solely because
of a record of criminal convictions is inherently discriminatory and
in violation of Title VII.11 The court concluded that "[t]he crucial
issue therefore is whether the hotel's policy has been shown to be
required by its business needs."57 If the court had limited the scope
of these business needs to job performance, the inquiry would have
merely concerned whether or not the plaintiff could perform the me-
chanical duties (carrying luggage) required by the position. However,
the court looked also to the "security sensitive" nature of the bell-
man's position, 58 and thus properly recognized that different barriers
52. Id. at 1487.
53. In Johrvon, defendant employer offered no evidence of substantial expense or
inefficiency. Instead, the undefined use of "expenses and time" of the clerical staff
were offered. Such undefined evidence of administrative costs would not outweigh the
mandate of Title VII which reflects society's interest in non-discriminatory employ-
ment, and the individual's interest in fair treatment.
54. 332 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. La. 1971), aff'd without opinion 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir.
1972).
55. 332 F. Supp. at 520.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 521.
58. "Bellmen occupy one of the several positions that the hotel considers 'security
sensitive.' They have access to guests' luggage and guests' rooms. They are permitted
to obtain room keys from the desk clerk and even go behind the desk for keys. They
may go through hotel corridors unaccompanied without provoking inquiry. They may
[Vol. 35
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and their effects must be measured against a flexible scope of busi-
ness necessity which may or may not outweigh the discriminatory
results.
In concluding that the business needs involved did in fact out-
weigh the discriminatory results, the court reasoned:
A past criminal record affords no basis to predict that a given
person will commit a future crime. But the evidence indicates
that a group of persons who have been convicted of serious crimes
will have a higher incidence of future criminal conduct than those
who have never been convicted. It is reasonable for management
of a hotel to require that persons employed in positions where
they have access to valuable property of others have a record
reasonably free from convictions for serious property related
crimes.59
One district court avoided choosing between the competing busi-
ness necessity concepts by merely ignoring the standard approach to
Title VII cases. In Merriweather v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. ," the
plaintiff, a prospective employee, failed to disclose in his application
for employment and in a subsequent Identification and Employment
Record form,6" four previous employers and a conviction for assault
with intent to rape." Subsequently, plaintiff was discharged when the
enter and leave the hotel by any exit during the day, carrying parcels, while most
employees must use a special employees' entrance where they are subject to inspection.
Some effort is made by the head bellman to be aware of the whereabouts of bellmen
during the day. Bellmen are expected to keep time records showing their activities. But
these are not carefully scrutinized and they can of course be easily evaded: a bellman
going to any specified room on a real errand might stop by another room en route
without making any entry on the duty sheet." Id.
59. Id. The hotel was not guilty of any overt discrimination. The court noted that
the hotel had an "exemplary" record with regard to affording job opportunities to
minority group members at all levels of its operation. This resulted in a work force of
61 percent minority group members at all levels of its operations, while the minority
population in the New Orleans Metropolitan area was only 31 percent. Id. at 522.
Evidence also showed that the challenged policy had been applied equally as to both
blacks and whites. Id. at 521. A white bellman had been terminated on the basis of a
record of criminal convictions some two months prior to plaintiff's discharge. Id. at 522.
"While not decisive these factors suggest that the requirement was not intentionally
invidious." Id. at 521.
60. 362 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
61. The Identification and Employment Record form contained the following
legend: "I authorize investigation of all statements contained in this employment
record and I understand that my continued employment with the Company is predi-
cated upon the truthfulness of the statement herein contained. Having read the entire
contents of this employment and identification record, I place my signature hereto of
my own free will and accord." The plaintiff signed this record. Id. at 671.
62. Id.
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employer learned of the previously undisclosed facts." In resolving
plaintiff's claim of unlawful discrimination against him, the court did
not even discuss the concept of business necessity. Instead of consid-
ering whether or not legitimate and justifiable business reasons ex-
isted for the employer to require such information despite possible
"chilling effects" on prospective employees,84 the court avoided the
issue entirely and- held that the discharge of plaintiff was based on
falsification of records and not on racial discrimination. 5
Had the Merriweather court applied the business necessity test,
which was clearly appropriate under the facts of the case, it could
have reached the same conclusion. The presence of a fair proportion
of blacks on the defendant's work site"8 could be thought to justify
some flexibility in the definition of business needs, as such statistics
tend to show that the standard in question does not provide a "ready
mechanism for discrimination"87 within the employer's own work
force. Thus, the business necessity test in such cases should include
consideration of the safety and efficiency of the work operation and
not merely the mechanical aspects of job performance.8
The results of the standard used in Merriweather were discrimi-
natory because proportionately more blacks than whites are con-
victed of serious crimes. But employers should be allowed to consider
an applicant's conviction records and previous employment if there
63. Id. at 672.
64. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has held that reasonable
cause exists to find a violation of Title VII when a black employee is discharged for
failing to list previous arrests. E.E.O.C. Decision No. 71-2089, 4 F.E.P. Cases 148
(1971): The commission objected to the "chilling effect" such inquiries might have on
black applicants, leading to falsification of employment data, which in turn would
result in a disproportionate number of blacks being discharged for falsifying employ-
ment data. The Supreme Court in Griggs said that EEOC findings are entitled to
"great deference." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971).
65. Id. Judgment was rendered for defendant with costs. It should be noted that
the court in Richardson refused to award attorney's fees to the prevailing defendant
hotel against the indigent plaintiff saying: "What practical purpose such an award
would serve in this matter is inscrutable, though it might conceivably serve as a
precedent in terrorem to discourage other Title VII plaintiffs." Richardson v. Hotel
Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 519, 521 (E.D. La. 1971).
66. As contrasted with the Birmingham Metropolitan area's 25 percent black
population, defendant's work force from 1968-1972 contained 28-32 percent black em-
ployees. 362 F. Supp. at 672. See also note 60 supra.
67. See text at notes 19-23 supra.
68. Unlike situations involved in Bing v. Roadway Express, see text at notes 24-
29 supra, where the employer's work unit was prima facie evidence of discrimination,
the court should give an employer more latitude in justifying discriminatory results
when racial balance in his work force indicates a prima facie case of good faith at-
tempts to counter employment discrimination.
COMMENTS
is a legitimate business interest in securing such information. Accur-
ate information as to prior convictions would be relevant in assigning
an applicant to an appropriate position and thereby ensuring that he
not be placed in a position "custodial" in nature,"9 where higher
standards of honesty and character might be required. Moreover,
even using the narrower test of job performance, the employer would
find justification in seeking accurate information about the appli-
cant's prior employment, because past job performance may well be
indicative of future employment suitability. The importance of such
legitimate and necessary information to the employer clearly out-
weighs the possible impact of any "chilling effect" upon prospective
employees in being required to reveal the requested information.
Thus, rather than grounding the decision in Merriweather upon the
finding that the "true" cause of discharge was falsification of data
and not the presence of discrimination, the court should have held
that the legitimate business interest in obtaining accurate and truth-
ful data as to prior conviction and employment was justifiable despite
the fact that requiring such data might lead to discriminatory results.
Conclusion
When statistics reveal that in a particular work unit minority
group members are not represented in proportion to their presence in
the population, it is both just and logical for courts to apply a re-
stricted definition of business necessity. In those instances, it is the
absence of minority representation in the jobs themselves that is
placed directly at issue. Courts should look to the performance neces-
sary to fulfill those jobs and view with skepticism other claims of
business necessity. If the employment practice fails to have a sub-
stantial relationship to job performance, it is reasonable to conclude,
on the basis of unequal representation in the work unit, that there is
unlawful discrimination.
However, where discrimination results from the use of arrest
records, garnishments, and other criteria which may reflect social
prejudices, it is reasonable and proper for the employer to interpose
considerations of safety and efficiency in formulating employment
policies for the job concerned. If substantial reasons can be advanced
for the discriminatory results under this broader scope of business
necessity, it may be concluded that there is no violation of the Act.
W Richard House, Jr.
69. See text at note 62 supra.
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